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Abstract 
This paper finds evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS 
countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was 
disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios, and was the result of 
negative market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010.  
We also find evidence that after years of neglecting high government debt, investors became 
increasingly worried about this in the eurozone, and reacted by raising the spreads. No such 
worries developed in stand-alone countries despite the fact that debt-to-GDP ratios were 
equally high and increasing in these countries. We interpreted this evidence as validating the 
hypothesis formulated in De Grauwe (2011) according to which government bond markets 
in a monetary union are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises 
than in stand-alone countries.  
We argue that the systematic mispricing of sovereign risk in the eurozone intensifies 
macroeconomic instability, leading to bubbles in good years and excessive austerity in bad 
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Introduction 
The sudden emergence of the government debt crisis in the eurozone in 2009 poses serious 
problems for the survival of the eurozone. It also poses serious problems for economic 
theories.  
The common theory about the spreads in the government bond rates in a monetary union is 
that these spreads reflect default risks. The default risk in turn is determined by a number of 
fundamental variables. The most important of these fundamental variables is the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio which is a measure of the potential of a government to 
service its debt.  
Figure 1 presents the 10-year government bond spreads in the eurozone since 1999. These 
spreads are defined as the difference of the government bond rates of each country with the 
German government bond rate. The latter is assumed to be free of default risk. The evidence 
of Figure 1 immediately poses serious empirical puzzles. First, during the period 2000-08 the 
spreads were very close to zero indicating that the default risks were perceived to be 
practically zero for all the eurozone countries. Yet, as will be shown, underlying 
fundamentals were widely different among these countries. Second, from 2008 there is a 
dramatic increase in the spreads. As will be made clear, these increases are significantly 
larger than the changes in the underlying fundamentals. These puzzles raise the question of 
whether financial markets may have mispriced risks either before or after the start of the 
crisis, or in both periods.  
In this paper we analyze these puzzles and the mispricing question. This will lead us to 
develop the hypothesis that the spreads can be subject to ‘bubbles’, i.e. to movements that 
are dissociated from the underlying fundamentals. Note that underlying the increases in the 
spreads are the declines in the prices of the government bonds. Thus, the phenomena 
observed in Figure 1 could also be interpreted as being the result of negative ‘bubbles’ in the 
bond prices.  
The analysis of such ‘bubbles’ is important because as argued in De Grauwe (2011) they can 
lead to multiple equilibria whereby countries are driven into a bad equilibrium characterized 
by self-fulfilling default crises and deep recessions. This potential for generating multiple 
equilibria makes the types of bubbles in the spreads different from the classical bubbles in 
the stock markets. The latter invariably lead to a crash in the stock prices whereby these 
prices are pushed back to their underlying fundamental values (see Kindleberger, 2005). It is 
not clear that the ‘bubbles’ in the spreads have this feature, i.e. it cannot be excluded that 
they push a country into a bad equilibrium that has the effect of changing the fundamentals 
in a self-fulfilling way. It is important therefore to find out whether such movements in the 
spreads that are disconnected from underlying fundamentals have occurred in the eurozone.  2 |  DE G
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do this in Figure 2, which shows the spreads (vertical axis) as a function of the debt-to-GDP 
ratios (horizontal axis) in the eurozone countries. Each point is a particular observation of 
one of the countries in a particular quarter (sample period 2000Q1-2011Q2). We also draw a 
straight line obtained from a simple regression of the spread as a function of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio.  
We observe first that there is a positive relation (represented by the positively sloped 
regression line) between the spread and the debt-to-GDP ratio, i.e. higher spreads are 
associated with higher debt-to-GDP ratios. We will return to this relationship and present 
more precise statistical results in the next section.  
Second, it appears that only a small fraction of the total variation of the spreads can be 
accounted for by the debt-to-GDP ratio. While the debt-to-GDP ratio increases from 
approximately 20 to close to 160 across the sample, the simple regression line tells us that 
this should lead to an increase of the spread from 0 to approximately 2% (200 basis points). 
We observe, however, that the spreads increase to approximately 12% (1200 basis points). 
There is thus a lot of unexplained increase in the spread. The purpose of this paper will be to 
investigate how much of the spread can be explained by fundamental variables (such as the 
debt-to-GDP ratio) and how much is left unexplained?  
Figure 2. Spreads and debt-to-GDP ratio in eurozone (2000-11) 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream. 
 
A third observation to be made from Figure 2 is that the deviations from the fundamental 
line (the regression line) appear to occur in bursts that are time dependent. We show this in 
Figure 3 which is the same as Figure 2 but where we have circled all observations that are 
more than 3 standard deviations from the fundamental line. It is striking to find that all these 
observations concern three countries (Greece, Portugal and Ireland) and that these 
observations are highly time dependent, i.e. the deviations start at one particular moment of 
time and then continue to increase in the next consecutive periods. It is as if ‘bubbles’ occurs 
in the spreads that lead to ever increasing deviations from the fundamental line. Put 
differently, the dramatic increases in the spreads that we observe in these countries from 
2010 on do not appear to be much related to the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratios during 
the same period. Why do we observe this phenomenon that suggest that spreads increase in 
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where Iit is the interest rate spread of country i in period t,     is the current account surplus 
of country i in period t, and       is the government debt-to-GDP ratio of country i in period 
t,   is the constant term and    is country i’s fixed effect.  
 
The non-linear specification is as follows: 
 
                                                                 
 
After having established by a Hausmann test that the random effect model is inappropriate, 
we used a fixed effect model. A fixed effect model helps to control for unobserved time-
invariant variables and produces unbiased estimates of the ‘fundamental variables’. The 
results of estimating the linear and non-linear models are shown in Tables 1 and 2. These 
results lead to the following interpretations.  
First, the debt-to-GDP ratio has a significant effect on the spreads. The current account, 
however, although it has the right sign does not appear to be significant. Second, the non-
linear specification improves the fit. This can be seen from the fact that the R-square 
increases from -0.60 (in the linear specification) to -0.74 (in the non-linear specification). In 
addition, the squared debt-to-GDP ratio is very significant. Thus, an increasing debt-to-GDP 
ratio has a non-linear effect on the spreads, i.e. a given increase of that ratio has a 
significantly higher impact on the spread when the ratio is high.  
Table 1. Long-term government bond rate spread against Germany (%) 
 (1)  (2) 
Current account GDP ratio  -0.0380  -0.0064 
 [0.0303]  [0.0439] 
Debt to GDP ratio  0.0795***  -0.0454 
 [0.0187]  [0.0420] 
Debt to GDP ratio squared    0.0008** 
[0.0003] 
Country fixed effect  Controlled  Controlled 
Observations 460  460 
R squared 
 
0.60 
 
0.74 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Cluster at the country level and robust standard error is shown in the brackets. 
3.  Structural breaks 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that a structural break has occurred since the start of the financial 
crisis. It is important to analyse the nature of that structural break.  6 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
As preliminary evidence we show in Figures 4 and 5 the plot of the spreads as a function of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio both before and after 2008. We also show, as in Figure 2, the simple 
regression line. The contrast between the periods is striking. Prior to the crisis the large 
differences in the debt-to-GDP ratios (ranging from about 20% to more than 100%) do not 
seem to have a visible effect on the spreads. Thus, during the pre-crisis period financial 
markets were saying that debt-to-GDP ratios do not matter for the solvency of countries. As 
a result, financial markets exerted no disciplinary effect on high debt governments.  
Things changed dramatically since the start of the financial crisis (see Figure 5). We now 
observe that the regression line is positively sloped (and significant) suggesting that 
suddenly financial markets started to look at the debt-to-GDP ratios in setting default risks. 
Why the markets suddenly changed their minds remains puzzling. It certainly suggests that 
they do not always use all available information to price government bonds, which goes 
against the efficient market theory. It also suggests that serious mispricing of risk occurred. 
Figure 4. Spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios in eurozone prior to 2008 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream.  
 
Figure 5. Spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios in eurozone after 2008 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream.  
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We also observe from Figure 5 that even in the post-crisis period there is a large unexplained 
component. We continue to observe large deviations of the spreads from their fundamental 
value as presented by the regression line. In addition, these deviations are strongly 
correlated over time, appearing at the same time and involving the countries mentioned 
earlier (Greece, Ireland, Portugal).  
As in the previous section we applied a fixed effect model (both linear and non-linear) for 
the pre- and post-crisis periods. A Chow test revealed that indeed a structural break 
occurred around the year 2008, allowing us to treat the pre- and post crisis periods as 
separate. We show the results in Table 2 
 
Table 2. Long-term government bond rate spread against Germany (%) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Pre-crisis_  Post-crisis  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
Current account GDP ratio  0.0011 -0.0033 0.0032  0.0210 
 [0.0051]  [0.0457]  [0.0064]  [0.0384] 
Debt to GDP ratio  0.0077*  0.1029***  -0.0031  -0.0865*** 
 [0.0037]  [0.0280]  [0.0107]  [0.0216] 
Debt to GDP ratio squared      0.0001  0.0012*** 
     [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
Country fixed effect  Controlled  Controlled Controlled  Controlled 
Observations 320  140  320  140 
R squared  0.4848  0.7233  0.5056  0.8633 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Cluster at the country level and robust standard error is shown in the bracket. 
 
The contrast between the pre- and post-crisis periods is striking. From Table 2 we observe 
that coefficient of the debt-to-GDP ratio prior to the crisis is low and only marginally 
significant, in the post-crisis period this coefficient becomes much larger and is statistically 
significant. Similar results are obtained by Schuknecht et al. (2010), Arghyrou & Kontonikas 
(2010), Borgy et al. (2011) and Gibson et al. (2011).  
We obtain a similar result in the non-linear model. In fact, in the pre-crisis period, there does 
not seem to be a non-linear effect. The squared debt-to-GDP ratio is low and insignificant. 
After the crisis, however, the non-linearity is significant as can be seen from the highly 
significant coefficient of the squared debt-to-GDP ratio.  
4.  Stand-alone countries 
We have observed in the previous sections that there is a strong break in the data of the 
eurozone. Prior to 2008 financial markets were unconcerned about the large differences in 
debt-to-GDP ratios and vastly underestimated risks. Since 2008 the debt-to-GDP ratio 
became important in explaining the spreads. However, we also found out that there is a 
large unexplained component that is highly time dependent. 
Do the same developments occur in ‘stand-alone’ countries, i.e. countries that are not part of 
a monetary union and issue debt in their own currencies? We analyse this question in the 
present section. We selected eight ‘stand-alone’ developed countries (Australia, Denmark, 8 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, US and UK) and computed the spreads of the 10-
year government bond rates. In order to make the analysis comparable with our analysis of 
the eurozone countries, we selected the same default risk government bond, i.e. the German 
government bond. We could also have selected the US government bond. In fact doing so 
leads to very similar results.  
It is important to stress that the spreads between ‘stand-alone’ countries reflect not only 
default risk but also exchange rate risk. It is even likely that the latter dominates the default 
risk, as exchange rates exhibit large fluctuations thereby creating large risks resulting from 
these fluctuations. In the econometric analysis we will therefore introduce exchange rate 
changes as an additional explanatory variable of the spreads. Before we do this, we present 
the plots of the spreads and the debt-to-GDP ratios in the same way as we did for the 
eurozone countries in section 2. The result is shown in Figure 6.  
Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 2 of the eurozone countries, we find striking differences. 
First, the short-term volatility of the spreads is higher most of the time in the stand-alone 
countries. This probably has to do with the variability of the exchange rates. Second, one 
country, Japan, stands out with its negative spreads throughout the whole period. (The 
Japanese spreads are the points below the zero line and above the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio.) 
Thus, Japan seems to be a special case, which is probably related to the structural 
appreciation of the Yen (see McKinnon, 2003). This leads to ingrained expectations of 
appreciation creating expected future capital gains. These expectations, in turn allow the 
Japanese government to issue debt at a lower interest rate. In the econometric analysis, 
where we add the exchange rate changes and fixed effects for each country we will be able to 
take care of these problems.  
Figure 6. Spreads of 10-year bond rates of ‘stand-alone’ countries, 2000-11 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream. The debt-to-GDP ratios of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the 
US are calculated using data from their central banks. 
 
A third difference with the eurozone countries is that the debt-to-GDP ratio seems to have a 
very weak effect on the spreads. Fourth, and most importantly, we observe the absence of 
‘bubble-like’ behaviour of the spreads. That is, we do not detect sudden and time dependent 
large departures of the spreads from its fundamental. All the observations, although volatile 
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in the short-run, cluster together around some constant number between 0% and 2% for the 
stand-alone countries without Japan, and between -2% and 4% for Japan.  
A fifth difference is that there does not seem to be a structural break with the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2008. This is made clear from Figures 7 and 8. The financial crisis does not 
seem to have changed the relationship between spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios, i.e. it 
appears that since the financial crisis the link between spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios have 
remained equally weak for the stand-alone countries. This contrasts a great deal with the 
eurozone countries, where this link increased significantly in the post-crisis period. Thus, 
financial markets are not eager to impose more discipline on the stand-alone countries since 
the start of the financial crisis, while they are very much so in the eurozone. This striking 
difference is illustrated in Figure 9 where we combine the observations of the eurozone 
countries (Figure 5) and of the stand-alone countries (Figure 8). 
Figure 7. Spreads of 10-year bond rates of ‘stand-alone’ countries, 2000-08 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Spreads of 10-year bond rates of ‘stand-alone’ countries, 2008-11 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream. The debt-to-GDP ratios of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the 
US are calculated using data from their central banks. 
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Figure 9. Spreads of 10-year bonds of eurozone and ‘stand-alone’ countries, 2000-11 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream. The debt-to-GDP ratios of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the 
US are calculated using data from their central banks. 
 
We now turn to an econometric analysis. We only present the results of a linear specification. 
The reason is that we could not detect any non-linearity in the effects of the debt-to-GDP 
ratios on the spreads. As mentioned earlier, we have now added the percentage change in 
the exchange rate of each stand-alone country against the euro. Ideally, we should use the 
expected future exchange rate changes. However, estimating future expected exchange rate 
changes is a perilous undertaking. Therefore, we use the observed changes, taking the view 
that the observed and forecasted exchange rate changes are highly correlated over a 
sufficiently long period of time.  
The results of Table 3 lend themselves to the following interpretation. First, as could be 
guessed from the visual inspection of Figure 6, the debt-to-GDP ratio has no significant effect 
on the spreads. Financial markets do not seem to be concerned with the size of the 
government debt and its impact on the spreads of stand-alone countries, despite the fact that 
the variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio is of a similar order of magnitude as the one observed 
in the eurozone. In section 7 we interpret this paradox.  
Second, the exchange rate changes have a significant effect on the spreads. This is no surprise 
given what we observed from Figures 6 to 8. Third, the current account has a significant 
effect on the spreads. This may be due to the Japanese phenomenon. The high current 
account surpluses of this country have the effect of reducing the spreads for any given level 
of debt-to-GDP ratio. Note that we could not find such a significant current account effect in 
the eurozone countries.  
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Table 3. Long-term government bond rate spread against Germany (%) 
 (1)  (2) 
Current account GDP ratio  -0.0469**  -0.0426** 
 [0.0155]  [0.0135] 
Debt to GDP ratio  0.0147  -0.0067 
 [0.0081]  [0.0128] 
Debt to GDP ratio squared    0.0001* 
   [0.0000] 
Exchange rate against euro  -0.0283***  -0.0279** 
 [0.0071]  [0.0085] 
Country fixed effect  controlled  controlled 
Observations 368  368 
R squared  0.9230  0.9312 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Cluster at the country level and robust standard error is shown in the bracket. 
 
We also performed a Chow test for a structural break. In contrast with the results for the 
eurozone we could not detect a structural break in the effect of the debt-to-GDP ratio before 
and after the crisis. Thus, both before and after the emergence of the financial crisis the 
markets disregard the debt-to-GDP ratios of stand-alone countries as variables that can affect 
the solvency of countries. A very puzzling result, to which we return in section 7.  
The contrast between the eurozone and stand-alone countries is also made clear by a pooled 
regression of the eurozone and the stand-alone countries. We do this in Table 4. We have 
added an interaction variable ‘Debt to GDP*eurozone’ which measure the degree to which 
the debt-to-GDP ratio affects the eurozone spreads differently from the stand-alone 
countries. The results of Table 4 confirm the previous results. The debt-to-GDP is a much 
stronger and significant variable in the eurozone than in the stand-alone countries. The latter 
seem to be able to ‘get away with murder’ and still not be disciplined by financial markets.  
Table 4. Long-term government bond rate spread against Germany (%) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Total  sample  Pre-crisis_  Post-crisis 
Current account GDP ratio  -0.0408*  -0.0240*  -0.0092 
 [0.0208]  [0.0134]  [0.0244] 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  0.0146*  0.0164  0.0190** 
 [0.0078]  [0.0133]  [0.0083] 
Debt-to-GDP ratio*eurozone  0.0649***  -0.0069  0.0844*** 
 [0.0198]  [0.0141]  [0.0288] 
Exchange rate against euro  -0.0283***  -0.0324***  -0.0200** 
 [0.0067]  [0.0104]  [0.0076] 
Country fixed effect  controlled  controlled  controlled 
Observations 828  576  252 
R squared  0.7669  0.9230  0.7981 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Cluster at the country level and robust standard error is shown in the bracket. 
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To summarise, we find a great contrast between the eurozone countries and the stand-alone 
countries. In the former, we detected a significant increase in the effect of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio on the spreads since 2008. Such an increase is completely absent in the stand-alone 
countries. Second, there appears to be significant departures of the spreads from their 
fundamental values in the eurozone countries after the start of the crisis, suggesting that 
time dependent movements in market sentiments become important. This does not seem to 
be observed in the stand-alone countries.  
5.  Introducing time dependency 
In order to measure the importance of time dependent effects on the spreads, we introduce 
time dependency in the basic fixed effect model. In the non-linear specification this yields:  
 
                                                                      
 
where    is the time dummy variable. This measures the time effects that are unrelated to the 
fundamentals of the model or (by definition) to the fixed effects. If significant, it shows that 
the spreads move in time unrelated to the fundamentals forces driving the yields. 
We estimated this model for both the stand-alone and the eurozone countries. In addition, 
we estimated the model separately for two subgroups of the eurozone, i.e. the core and the 
periphery. The results are shown in Table 5. The contrast between stand-alone and eurozone 
countries is striking. We could not detect significant effects of the time variable in the stand-
alone countries. In the eurozone we detect significant time effects especially since 2008. Thus, 
during the post crisis period the spreads were gripped by surges that were independent 
from the underlying fundamentals. These time effects were especially strong in the 
periphery during 2010-11. Thus the disconnection of the spreads from their fundamentals 
seems to have been the most pronounced in the countries where the spreads surged most.  
Finally we plot the time effects obtained from Table 5 in Figure 9. This suggests that 
especially in the periphery ‘bubbles’ occurred in the spreads, i.e. an increase in the spreads 
that cannot be accounted for by fundamental developments, in particular by the changes in 
the debt-to-GDP ratios during the crisis. Put differently, while before the crisis the markets 
did not see any risk in the peripheral countries’ sovereign debt, after the crisis, they 
exaggerated these risks dramatically. Thus, mispricing of risks (in both directions) seems to 
have been an endemic feature in the eurozone.   MISPRICING OF SOVEREIGN RISK AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN THE EUROZONE | 13 
 
Table 5. Long-term government bond rate spread against Germany (%) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Stand-alone_  Eurozone  Core  Eurozone  Periphery 
Current account GDP ratio  -0.0462**  0.0305  -0.0055  0.0063 
Debt to GDP ratio  -0.0114  -0.0519  -0.0409  -0.0612 
Debt to GDP ratio squared  0.0001  0.0008**  0.0003  0.0008** 
2000Q2 -0.1084  0.0446  0.0017  -0.0283 
2000Q3 -0.0876  0.1070*  0.0174  -0.0123 
2000Q4 -0.0936  0.3910**  0.0383  0.3143 
2001Q1 -0.0463  0.3432**  0.0315  0.3136 
2001Q2 -0.1138  0.3548**  0.0335  0.3619 
2001Q3 0.0626  0.3716**  0.0348  0.3556 
2001Q4 0.0457  0.3635**  -0.0107  0.2453 
2002Q1 -0.1017  0.2391  -0.0694  0.2775 
2002Q2 -0.0622  0.3007  -0.0652  0.2638 
2002Q3 -0.0032  0.2895  -0.0549  0.2726 
2002Q4 -0.0547  0.3436  -0.0728  0.1673 
2003Q1 0.0557  0.2524  -0.1288*  0.1539 
2003Q2 0.0080  0.2385  -0.0720  0.1550 
2003Q3 0.0328  0.2578  -0.1028  0.1921 
2003Q4 0.0395  0.3747  -0.0982  0.1969 
2004Q1 0.0051  0.2572  -0.1182  0.1573 
2004Q2 0.1210  0.2341  -0.0798  0.1085 
2004Q3 0.0612  0.2453  -0.0790  0.0797 
2004Q4 0.1517  0.4176  -0.0694  0.1543 
2005Q1 0.2223  0.2846  -0.1671*  0.1181 
2005Q2 0.2450  0.2521  -0.1134  0.0673 
2005Q3 0.3105  0.2871  -0.1265  0.0424 
2005Q4 0.3235  0.3068  -0.1392  -0.1397 
2006Q1 0.2059  0.2913  -0.1554  -0.0470 
2006Q2 0.1669  0.3007  -0.1085  -0.0574 
2006Q3 0.1607  0.3325  -0.1296  -0.0645 
2006Q4 0.1443  0.3995  -0.1223  -0.1063 
2007Q1 0.0407  0.3617  -0.1350  -0.1198 
2007Q2 0.0108  0.3840  -0.1188  -0.0745 
2007Q3 0.0357  0.4684  -0.0784  0.0399 
2007Q4 0.0906  0.6486*  -0.0557  0.0513 
2008Q1 0.1020  0.6512*  -0.0005  0.1629 
2008Q2 0.0356  0.7457**  0.0644  0.2427 
2008Q3 -0.1494  0.7902**  0.1008  0.2560 
2008Q4 -0.0133  1.0087**  0.4403**  0.6465 
2009Q1 -0.1046  1.2046***  0.7222***  1.2463* 
2009Q2 0.0720  0.6873*  0.4808***  0.5392 
2009Q3 0.1790  0.2078  0.2728**  -0.0722 
2009Q4 0.2483  0.1645  0.2761**  -0.1206 
2010Q1 0.3000  0.0964  0.2074*  -0.0067 
2010Q2 0.3962  0.5582  0.3844**  1.1075 
2010Q3 0.3993  0.8750  0.3861  1.9239 
2010Q4 0.4151  1.1436*  0.4903*  2.4485** 
2011Q1 0.1994  1.0117*  0.4693  2.2208** 
2011Q2 0.0817  1.6274*  0.5345*  3.7585* 
Exchange rate against euro  -0.0220**       
Country fixed effect  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled 
Observations 368  460  276  184 
R squared  0.9409  0.8018  0.8351  0.9425 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster at the country level and robust standard error is shown in the 
bracket. Chow test shows a split between the new and early members. 
Core eurozone = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, Italy, Spain. 
Periphery: Ireland, Greece, Portugal. 14 |  DE G
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Figure 11. Observed spreads and estimated spreads using F-model and FT-model 
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6.  Theoretical implications 
In the previous sections we found two important pieces of evidence. First, since the start of 
the financial crisis, financial markets have started worrying about the high debt-to-GDP 
ratios in the eurozone, and have interpreted these high and increasing debt-to-GDP ratios as 
leading to default risk. No such worries have developed in stand-alone countries despite the 
fact that debt-to-GDP ratios were equally high and increasing in these countries. Second, we 
observed that in the eurozone the spreads can move away from underlying fundamentals 
(such as the debt-to-GDP ratio) in a ‘bubble-like’ fashion. No such ‘bubbles’ were observed 
in our sample of stand-alone countries.  
How can these phenomena be explained? In De Grauwe (2011), a theoretical explanation was 
provided along the following lines.4 Members of a monetary union issue government debt in 
a currency they do not control. As a result, the governments of these countries cannot 
guarantee that the cash will always be available to pay out the bondholders. This contrasts 
with stand-alone countries; which owing to the fact they have their own central bank, can 
always make sure that the cash will be there to pay out bondholders. The absence of a 
guarantee that the cash will always be available creates a situation in a monetary union in 
which a liquidity crisis arises. And because such a crisis leads to large increases in the 
interest rate on government debt it can drive governments of a monetary union into default. 
The important ingredient in this dynamics is its self-fulfilling nature: when investors start 
fearing default they will sell the bonds, creating a liquidity crisis that degenerates into a 
solvency crisis. The fear of insolvency creates conditions that make insolvency more likely. 
This fragility has two effects. First, investors become more nervous when the debt-to-GDP 
ratios increase in member countries of a monetary union (as they did after 2008) than when 
similar increases occur in stand-alone countries. Put differently increases in the debt-to-GDP 
ratios lead to fears of default that in a monetary union can lead to default in a self-fulfilling 
way. This self-fulfilling dynamics is absent in stand-alone countries. As a result, the 
sensitivity of the spreads to the debt-to-GDP ratios is weak in the latter countries.  
                                                      
4 For a more formal model see also De Grauwe (2011). There exist many formal theoretical models that 
create self-fulfilling liquidity crises. Many of these have been developed for explaining crises in the 
foreign exchange markets (see Obstfeld (1986)). Other models have been applied to the government 
debt (Calvo (1988), Gros (2011) and Corsetti & Dedola (2011)).  
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Second, the fragility of a monetary union also implies that fears are enlarged and through 
contagion can take panic proportions, very much like one observes in banking systems that 
exhibit a similar fragility (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). When fear and panic takes over sales of 
government bonds become massive creating increases in the interest rates (and the spreads) 
on government bonds in the absence of observable changes in the fundamentals. When such 
movements of distrust are triggered, the government bond rates tend to be driven away 
from their fundamentals. That is exactly what we observed in the data of the eurozone since 
2010. 
The potential for self-fulfilling liquidity and solvency crises in a monetary union also implies 
that countries can be driven into bad equilibria, that are characterized by high interest rates, 
a downturn in economic activity and a great pressure to apply budgetary austerity that 
because it intensifies the recession in the short run also has the tendency to raise the debt-to-
GDP ratios further (Blanchard, 2011).  
Thus when self-fulfilling crises occur that lead countries into a bad equilibrium, the 
fundamentals will tend to change over time. In particular, output declines so that the debt-
to-GDP ratio tends to increase, thereby validating the increased spreads. Our empirical 
results suggest that this may have been a feature in the eurozone during the sovereign debt 
crisis. We observed that while the time component becomes very important during a crisis, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio continued to surge, and in addition, the sensitivity of the spreads to 
the debt-to-GDP ratio increased.  
Conclusion 
There is now a widespread consensus that financial markets in the eurozone have been 
systematically wrong when during 2001-08 they were charging the same risk premium on 
Greek and German government bonds despite huge differences in debt-to-GDP ratios of 
these countries. Today, the same markets apply huge spreads on Greek (and other) 
government bonds. Many economists today take the view that the spreads the markets now 
impose are correct. But why is it that if markets were systematically mispricing risks and 
failed to see any risk during 2001-08, these same markets suddenly found the truth? 
In this paper we argued that financial markets did not suddenly find the truth. Since the start 
of the sovereign debt crisis they made errors in the other direction, i.e. they overestimated 
risks. We found evidence that a large part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries 
during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios, and 
was the result of negative market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010.  
We also found evidence that after years of neglecting high debt-to-GDP ratios, investors 
became increasingly worried about the high debt-to-GDP ratios in the eurozone, and reacted 
by raising the spreads. No such worries developed in stand-alone countries despite the fact 
that debt-to-GDP ratios were equally high and increasing in these countries. We interpreted 
this evidence as validating the hypothesis formulated in De Grauwe (2011) according to 
which government bond markets in a monetary union are more fragile and more susceptible 
to self-fulfilling liquidity crises. The stand-alone countries in our sample have been immune 
from these liquidity crises and weathered the storm without the increases in the spread.  
The story of the eurozone is also a story of systematic mispricing of the sovereign debt, 
which in turn led to macroeconomic instability and multiple equilibria. During the 2001-08 
period, the systematic under-pricing of the risk in the peripheral countries led to 
unsustainable booms in real estate and in consumption, until the crash occurred. The 
systematic overpricing of sovereign risk since 2010 had the effect of pushing these countries 
into bad equilibria characterised by solvency crises and deep recessions.  18 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
The systematic mispricing of sovereign debt observed in the eurozone also had the effect of 
giving wrong incentives to policymakers. During the boom years, when financial markets 
were blind to the sovereign risks, no incentives were given to policy makers to reduce their 
debts, as the latter were priced so favourably. Since the start of the financial crisis financial 
markets driven by panic overpriced risks and gave incentives to policymakers to introduce 
excessive austerity programmes.  
In a world where spreads are tightly linked to the underlying fundamentals such as the debt-
to-GDP ratio, the only option the policy makers have in reducing the spreads is to improve 
the fundamentals. This implies measures aimed at reducing the debt burden. If, however, 
there can be a disconnection between the spreads and the fundamentals, a policy geared 
exclusively towards affecting the fundamentals (i.e. reducing the debt burden) will not be 
sufficient. In that case policy makers should also try to stop countries from being driven into 
a bad equilibrium. This can be achieved by more active liquidity policies by the ECB that aim 
at preventing a liquidity crisis from leading to a self-fulfilling solvency crisis (Wyplosz, 2011 
and De Grauwe, 2011).  
It should be stressed that the policy aiming at improving the fundamentals through 
budgetary austerity and the policy of liquidity provision by the central bank are not 
substitutes, but complements. When a member-country of a monetary union is hit by a 
liquidity crisis that leads to a disconnection between the spreads and the fundamentals, both 
policies will in general be needed. All too often these two types of policies have been seen as 
‘either or’. In fact, as we have shown, in a monetary union conditions can arise in which both 
types of policies are required.   MISPRICING OF SOVEREIGN RISK AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN THE EUROZONE | 19 
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